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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to understand the role of being a senior manager in Indigenous community governance, 
particularly though not exclusively in remote Aboriginal communities. It argues against the tendency of 
analysts and would-be reformers of Indigenous community governance to focus on the competence and 
ethical qualities of those who, from time to time occupy these roles, and asks instead how can isolated 
managerialism in Indigenous community governance be overcome? 
The paper begins with Ralph Folds’ analysis of relations between Pintupi settlements and the larger Australian 
polity. While taking much from Folds’ analysis, the paper argues that he relies on too idealist a view of the 
Australian state and on a problematic distinction between the offi cial and private uses of publicly allocated 
resources. The paper argues that the state’s allocation of resources also inevitably involves a fl ow of private 
benefi ts and that public purposes and private benefi ts are not different phenomena, but rather different 
perspectives on state action. In light of this, the paper outlines a more thoroughly realist analysis of what 
it is to be a good senior manager in Indigenous community governance and then, in its concluding section, 
makes some suggestions for overcoming isolated managerialism.
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INTRODUCTION
I n 1999, the then Country Liberal Party Minister for Local Government in the Northern Territory, Loraine Braham, while introducing a reform agenda to the Legislative Assembly, noted that many community 
government councils in rural and remote areas ‘face continuing diffi culties in attracting suffi cient numbers 
of qualifi ed, competent and ethical staff’, and that many ‘fail to do so’. ‘At any given time’, she continued, 
‘at least 10’ of these councils in the Northern Territory ‘are in signifi cant fi nancial or managerial diffi culty’ 
(Braham 1999: 3). In 2002, the then Labor Minister, John Ah Kit, went somewhat further, claiming that it 
was ‘almost impossible to fi nd a functional Aboriginal community anywhere in the Northern Territory’. In 
attempting to explain the apparent failure ‘to build effective local government on Aboriginal communities’, 
he also noted that ‘skilled and dedicated council staff’ are ‘extremely diffi cult to recruit and retain … in 
remote centres’. He continued by referring to the ‘other side of the coin’: that ‘there have been any number 
of incompetent or crooked people working for Aboriginal communities’ (Ah Kit 2002: 7). While not wanting 
to be disrespectful to either of these ministers, I do want in this paper to call into question the emphasis 
placed in recent years on incompetent and unethical staff as an explanation for limited success in Indigenous 
community governance. 
In a recent paper, focused mainly on debates about greater regionalism in Northern Territory local 
government, I ended by noting that senior managerial staff in remote area Indigenous community 
governance organisations tend to come under ‘considerable community pressure over the allocation of 
resources’ and also to be isolated from peer support and supervision. In these circumstances of ‘isolated 
managerialism’, I argued, it is likely that senior managerial staff are ‘not so much unethical or incompetent 
at the start of the task, but rather become somewhat jaded and dissatisfi ed during its course’, often then 
leaving the organisation at a point of tension over the allocation of resources without managerial succession 
having been properly put in place. Indeed, in some instances, I noted, the administration of small Indigenous 
community government organisations can fall into complete disarray with the abrupt departure of senior 
managerial staff, before ‘the whole rather inadequate cycle of isolated managerialism’ starts all over again 
(Sanders forthcoming; see also Sanders 2004: 11).
In this paper I want to take this analysis of isolated managerialism somewhat further by asking what it takes 
to be a ‘good’ senior manager in an Indigenous community governance organisation. My focus is primarily, 
though not exclusively, on remote area organisations, and I will begin by considering Ralph Folds’ analysis 
of relationships between Pintupi settlements and the larger Australian polity (Folds 2001). Building on Folds’ 
analysis of what it means to be an institutional boss in such settlements, I will argue that senior managers 
in Indigenous community governance have to work with both public purpose and private benefi t, and 
that these are not different phenomena, but rather different perspectives on the allocation of resources. I 
will also argue that, while there are differences of worldview across the sociocultural interface in remote 
Indigenous settlements, Folds somewhat overstates his case due to a rather one-dimensional and idealist 
view of the Australian state. Folds’ analysis is, however, still a good foundation for outlining a realist view of 
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being a good senior manager in Indigenous community governance, which is the subject of the next section 
of the paper. In the fi nal section, I argue that rather than rushing to make judgments about how good or 
bad particular senior managers are, analysts and reformers should be focused instead on how to overcome 
isolated managerialism in Indigenous community governance.
BEING A BOSS IN PINTUPI SETTLEMENTS: THE FOLDS ANALYSIS
After an initial historical description of contact between the Pintupi and the settler society, Folds begins his 
analysis of ‘the contemporary interface’ by referring to his own personal experience as the school principal 
at Walungurru over more than a decade. He notes that the ‘dominant society’ views this role as ‘the bearer 
of important social justice values’ but that Pintupi dismiss such ‘institutional managers’ as mere ‘bosses for 
paper’. Quoting the anthropologist Fred Myers, Folds explains that the authority of bosses in Pintupi society 
is ‘sustained by generosity in providing access to valued resources (“looking after”) rather than [through] 
withholding them for the greater public good’ (Folds 2001: 40). Institutional managers who withhold 
resources from Pintupi ‘in order to fulfi l their offi cial purpose’ are considered ‘hard’ bosses who are ‘careless 
of relationships through their unreasonable greed’ (Folds 2001: 41).
Returning later to this idea, Folds explains as follows:
In declaring whitefellas ‘paper bosses’, Pintupi are saying they have no inherent power over them. For 
Pintupi the context of power is personal; their view is that a boss must fi rst develop a relationship with 
them, after which work is negotiated within that relationship. A boss who slashes his workers’ pay merely 
because they have not attended to all their duties is considered to care very little for the relationship, 
and perhaps to be unworthy of being a boss for them at all. As Myers puts it, ‘Hierarchy … exposed as 
non-nurturant [is] rejected (Folds 2001: 51).
Folds also notes that whitefella bosses who are ‘too directive’ are referred to as ramarama or ‘cheeky’ by 
Pintupi, which suggests another form of hardness alongside the withholding of resources.
Folds places this description of being a whitefella boss in a Pintupi settlement in a larger context of Pintupi 
values, economy and views of government or the state. The highest value of Pintupi life, he argues, is building 
relationships with walytja, meaning family or kin. This is done through an economy in which acquired 
resources are heavily used and quickly consumed, rather than in any sense preserved. ‘Value is expressed 
through use, rather than hoarding’ (Folds 2001: 70). Money is disposed of quickly, even when it arrives in 
unusually large quantities as a ‘windfall’ (Folds 2001: 75). While ‘reliance on relatives’ through ‘reciprocal 
claims’ on their acquired resources, far from being a ‘problem’, is ‘the life-blood of both the family and the 
economic system’ (Folds 2001: 76). Folds argues that Pintupi have a ‘patron-client’ view of government, 
or the state, similar to that of ‘seniors’ in traditional life. Both ‘hold’ or ‘look after’ people ‘in a material 
sense’ and in so doing build their moral authority (Folds 2001: 42). This view of the state takes us back to 
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the role of whitefella institutional bosses in Pintupi settlements, who are the primary local manifestation 
of government and who, as Folds notes, are ‘held accountable on both sides’ of this relationship between 
Pintupi and the state (Folds 2001: 41).
Folds also argues that the ‘Pintupi economy is antithetical to much that western society holds sacred’ 
and that because of this ‘the dominant society mistakenly assumes that the absence of a Pintupi impetus 
towards material accumulation is indicative of a deep malaise’ (Folds 2001: 76). He notes a major tension 
between Pintupi commitments to walytja and a state-based non-Indigenous project of pursuing ‘material 
equality’ through programs aimed at overcoming the disadvantage of particular ‘common-interest groups’, 
such as women, children, the old or the sick, in the name of ‘social justice’. He writes:
The social justice ideal of material equality, confi dently proclaimed as compatible with indigenous self-
determination, is actually being constantly overridden by the resilient cultural difference in what Pintupi 
consider responsible behaviour. When this happens, the lack of accountability is seen by mainstream 
bureaucracies to lie on the indigenous side. However, while the values of shared identity and walytja 
create obvious diffi culties for material prosperity, this is an outcome that represents a different logic of 
responsibility, not a lack of it (Folds 2001: 73–4).
Then later he writes:
Bureaucracies do not accept for a moment that particular groups chosen by Pintupi should be able to 
prioritise their access to resources ahead of the groups they (the bureaucrats) have chosen, such as the 
sick, women, children, the old or outstation residents (Folds 2001: 83).
Folds’ work is largely dedicated to exploring these ideas of fundamental tension and antithesis between 
state-based and Pintupi worldviews. He proceeds by an accumulation of stories about intervention programs 
which did not work out as intended by their state-based, social-justice-inspired designers, but which 
nonetheless Pintupi valued as a source of resources and which they incorporated into their own walytja-
based system of economy and society.
For example, Folds tells the story of a four-wheel-drive vehicle given under a Commonwealth Government 
program to the women of Walungurru ‘to empower them as a group’. He writes:
This sudden channelling of government resources fuelled the expansion of women’s interests. These 
were strengthened by the role of whitefellas who supported what they saw as the women’s interests 
against the men who, Pintupi women indignantly explained, were always greedy for anything they had 
(Folds 2001:95).
Folds goes on to explain that ‘newly acquired settlement resources’ are often initially used for their ‘intended 
purposes … out of deference to the government bosses who provide them’, but that ‘claims are quickly 
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staked’ for uses which, perhaps to western eyes, push at the margins of these purposes and that, once 
permitted, establish precedents or even rights for further use. When a relative of one of the women died 
in a ‘distant settlement’ the women’s truck was used for travel to ‘sorry business’ and to bring home the 
granddaughter of another woman who ‘held’ the truck. Folds writes:
Although the whitefellas had been wary of this ‘private’ use, the women who asked for the truck pointed 
out that it was, after all, not the whitefella’s personal property. The husband of one of the Pintupi women 
did the driving, thus establishing precedents for both ‘private’ use and male drivers. This was not lost on 
other men or relatives (Folds 2001: 96).
The women’s vehicle was soon travelling to ‘sorry business’ regularly and being used to pick up children and 
do many other things. Its use was even ‘demanded’ on such insubstantial grounds as ‘an old woman might 
need a lift home’. An attempt by the whitefella boss for the truck to put in place ‘strong rules’ for its use was 
summarised by Folds as follows:
Decisions along these lines were forcefully endorsed by Pintupi women when they met as an exclusive 
group and they seemed binding enough at the time, but outside the meetings the rules were instantly 
discarded. The rules were summed up by one woman as ‘not helping anyone’, and shameful edicts 
were quickly reversed or ignored in the face of demands from walytja. Ultimately, Pintupi could only 
make decisions based on relationships, not the offi cial purposes based on a collective of women (Folds 
2001: 96).
In light of these demands and the reversal or ignoring of the rules, the whitefella boss for the women’s truck 
‘complained bitterly that she felt little support’ or ‘public backup from the women’. If she enforced the rules 
and withheld the keys, she was accused of being ‘cheeky’ or ‘holding wrong way’. When she gave in, use of 
the truck was heavy and varied. Soon the truck was damaged during use by men on ‘travelling ceremonies’ 
and the whitefella boss was ‘roundly criticised by the women, who claimed she should not have given in 
to the men’, but who had found it ‘impossible’ themselves to refuse the men’s request. The exasperated 
whitefella manager now relinquished any claim to being ‘boss’ for the truck, but was severely criticised in 
doing so for ‘not helping’. Folds continues:
The status of the vehicle, as owned by any individual or group, now became nebulous and a series of 
public fi ghts over its use erupted until it was vandalised during a fi ght and removed to the settlement 
garage. Some Pintupi said it should be burned. A vehicle that had been fi ercely fought over was suddenly 
ignored, with many Pintupi expressing satisfaction that it had been immobilised since that stopped the 
incessant fi ghting (Folds 2001: 97)
This story tells us much about being a senior manager in an Indigenous community organisation, particularly 
in remote areas. But it is not this which Folds wants to emphasise and analyse at the end of his telling of the 
story. His primary concerns are the difference of worldviews between the state-based offi cials focused on 
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disadvantaged common-interest groups and the Pintupi focused on walytja and the way in which resources 
offered under the former worldview are integrated, during their use, into the Pintupi worldview. He writes:
A material resource offered in the quest for ‘social justice’ for a particular group is appropriated by 
Pintupi society, rather than changing it in the way intended. Targeting of disadvantage based on alien 
common-interest groups reinforces a view of government as an unfathomable and unpredictable boss, 
but since it provides opportunities for Pintupi to meet their own agenda they do not argue. While their 
options have been restricted to seizing these varied, apparently arbitrary, opportunities as they come 
along, they do not jeopardise their own enduring relationships with walytja in the process (Folds 2001: 
97).
When, in the light of this story and others, Folds does return specifi cally to the issue of being a whitefella 
managerial boss in a Pintupi settlement, he focuses interestingly on the ideas of corruption and 
accountability. He writes:
In Pintupi terms, a boss is in debt to those he has to deny and to the employees he directs … The settling 
of debt incurred by a boss to employees may well lead to pressure for corruption in western terms, 
because bosses may be compelled to support Pintupi activities by allowing non-offi cial and inequitable 
use of resources.
Bosses are simultaneously held accountable to the funding agencies they represent, and from whom 
they obtain the money needed to keep institutions running and, in a far more immediate sense, to 
Pintupi, who are themselves in no way accountable to those agencies and have a completely different 
worldview from them. Bosses are always vulnerable to accusations of corruption from the institution 
they are managing, the ‘community’ they are serving, and the wider society to whom they are ultimately 
accountable, groups whose understanding of the term can be oppositional (Folds 2001: 148).
Folds sees these frequent accusations of corruption as the product of the different worldviews operating on 
the different sides of the ‘settlement/institutional interface’, rather than being a particular refl ection on the 
competence or the ethical qualities of the individuals occupying the whitefella boss roles in the settlements. 
He acknowledges that these accusations of corruption place ‘enormous stress’ on the individuals at the 
interface and this reinforces one of his earlier points that:
Western institutions on Pintupi settlements are not comfortable places to be, as evidenced by the 
generally rapid turnover of their whitefella administrators (Folds 2001: 60).
Folds also addresses the issue of why Pintupi are often reluctant to take on these senior managerial roles in 
Indigenous community governance organisations, despite often having the literacy and other skills to do so. 
He writes:
An institutional boss is responsible for many people regardless of relationship, a role Pintupi—already 
fully obligated to relatives—regard as an acute form of punishment …
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Being responsible for, and to, non-relatives arouses heated complaints from one’s own kin. When a man 
was asked why he only took his own walytja in his (institutional) Toyota, he explained, ‘If I take others my 
walytja get angry with me’. To deny institutional resources to one’s own family makes Pintupi susceptible 
to the accusation of being ‘too hard’ (lacking compassion), as they are placed in the dangerous position 
of being expected to deny rightful claims from relatives in favour of institutional imperatives (Folds 
2001: 148).
Folds sees Pintupi as having worked out a ‘volatile, yet usually workable, compromise’ in which they ‘retain 
control over the direction of settlement institutions’ but employ ‘outsiders as ‘bosses’, to accept fi nal 
responsibility for their day to day operation’ (Folds 2001: 149).
On the issue of how the mainly non-Indigenous people who occupy managerial roles in Pintupi settlements 
should go about their task, Folds offers the following fragmentary insight and advice. He writes:
Whitefella bosses are not assigned authority by virtue of their positions. Nevertheless, they can choose 
to insist that they stand outside the relationship system and cling to the illusory authority they assume 
they bring with them to the settlement. Following this path they will be relentlessly informed of their 
obligations, told they are mad and publicly criticised for shortfalls that seem to them far removed from 
their offi cial role, because bosses are considered to have infi nite responsibility …
The value Pintupi place on their relationships with their bosses cannot be discounted for long, and 
since it is through those relationships that authority is expressed and institutional work done, it is self-
defeating to try to do so. That I would ‘hold’ Pintupi in my ‘employ’ while I worked for the community 
was not negotiable, although how I did so was open to debate (Folds 2001: 153).
This is clearly counsel to whitefella bosses to work with the Pintupi emphasis on relationships and walytja 
rather than thinking they have some other source of authority. But it is not counsel simply to abandon 
other accountabilities in favour of that to Pintupi and their worldview. Folds writes early in his account 
that as school principal he did not just allow his Pintupi workers the ‘autonomy’ to pursue their own 
interests, as they saw them, and that in his ‘recalcitrant clinging to western accountabilities’ he was often 
a ‘sad disappointment to them’ (Folds 2001: 52). Folds’ advice to senior managers seems, therefore, to be to 
strategically balance the different accountabilities to which they are subject from the different worldviews 
on the different sides of the settlement interface, rather than to abandon any one form of accountability 
in favour of another. 
This idea of senior managers in Indigenous community governance strategically balancing different 
accountabilities is quite helpful, but Folds does not give us the tools to take the analysis very far. How can 
one strategically manage or balance accountabilities which are coming from antithetical worldviews on the 
different sides of the settlement interface? Here I want to suggest that Folds has overdrawn the difference 
between those worldviews, not by taking issue with anything he says about Pintupi, but rather by taking 
issue with his images of the Australian state and his distinction between the public or offi cial purposes of 
state programs and the potential private uses, or benefi ts, of resources that fl ow from them.
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PUBLIC PURPOSES, PRIVATE BENEFITS AND IMAGES OF THE 
AUSTRALIAN STATE
At the beginning of his women’s truck story, Folds identifi es the use of the truck to attend a funeral as 
‘private’, though he also chooses to place the word in quotation marks. Throughout the passages above 
quoted from Folds, such private use is contrasted with ‘offi cial’ purposes or use, as if this were a reasonably 
clear and useful distinction. I want to suggest that while this distinction may seem useful in principle, it 
is in practice very hard to make and far from clear. I want to suggest this lack of clarity by asking in what 
way was using this truck to go to a funeral a private use and not a public or offi cial one? Recall that this 
truck was given to the women of Walungurru to empower them and to enhance their interests. So what did 
those who gave the truck to the women think it would be used for if not to attend funerals and to pick up 
and deliver people to and from distant settlements for various reasons—to run a sort of on-demand public 
transport system for Indigenous women and those close to them? It seems to me that there was in fact 
nothing particularly unoffi cial, or outside the public purpose, in this use. Rather the problem was simply one 
of heavy demand for a very valued and scarce resource, which saw it consumed not only very quickly and 
somewhat unequally, but also in the end somewhat acrimoniously.
Perhaps what ‘public’ or ‘offi cial’ use might mean in this instance is simply restricted use; just within the 
settlement, within offi ce hours, running women to and fro between their houses, the shop, the health 
centre and other centres of daily activity within the settlement, and perhaps also just driven by two or three 
authorised people, such as the whitefella boss for the women’s truck and one or two designated Indigenous 
women. But in what way would this be empowering the women of Walungurru as a more numerous group? 
And how could this restricted use pattern be defended against the accusation of hardness and not helping 
in the face of unmet need?
My own vehicle story from Walungurru comes from 2001 when I worked there for a single week investigating 
interest in being part of the Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme, a type of work-
for-the-dole arrangement which has been offered to increasing numbers of remote Indigenous settlements 
and other Indigenous communities since the late 1970s (Sanders 1988, 2001). As I was preparing to leave 
Walungurru after my week there, I was asked by one of the councillors with whom I had been working 
whether I could give him a lift to a settlement a couple of hundred kilometres away where there was a sports 
carnival that weekend. Naturally I said yes, and during the trip I was told how the Chief Executive Offi cer 
(CEO) of Walungurru Council restricted use of council vehicles for taking people to sports carnivals, usually 
to just one bus mainly for the competing teams. The councillor suggested that other council vehicles should 
also be made available for people like himself to attend and support the teams. Resisting the temptation 
to simply agree, (thereby implicitly criticising as ‘too hard’ the CEO with whom I had also just been working 
and also installing myself in some more enlightened and generous moral position of sympathetic softy), I 
sympathised with the diffi culty of the task of deciding how many council vehicles should be allowed to be 
used for attending sports weekends and who should have priority in travelling in them. Jokingly, seeing this 
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councillor was both quite old and had a badly injured leg, I suggested that he offer himself as the football 
team manager, which might in turn help secure him a place in the bus. This was accepted in the tenor in 
which it was offered, and our conversation soon turned to other things. However, after I had dropped the 
councillor at the sports carnival and was continuing on my way, I continued to refl ect on the diffi culty of 
distinguishing between public purposes and private benefi ts in the use of Walungurru Council resources.
Taking teams, particularly of young people, to sports carnivals is a public purpose to which most of us could 
quite easily relate. Taking spectators to sports carnivals or mourners to funerals might seem, in the larger 
Australian society, to be regarded as essentially private matters. But this is in circumstances of considerably 
more private affl uence and it is hard to say why, in other circumstances, these should not also be seen 
as worthwhile public purposes. This is particularly so if, in directing resources to Indigenous community 
organisations, governments are also promoting ideas such as community self-empowerment and self-
determination. Who better, under these philosophies, to decide on the precise nature of public purposes 
in Indigenous communities than Indigenous people themselves? Allowing Indigenous people in remote 
communities to make these decisions will probably lead to broad defi nitions of public purposes, and hence 
to heavy demands on Council resources, which will, in turn, be consumed very quickly. But this is not to say 
that these broadly-defi ned purposes are not legitimate and public. What appears to be being offended here 
is simply western sensibilities about how quickly resources like vehicles should be consumed. Within the 
western social world a vehicle is consumed within perhaps fi ve to fi fteen years, and somehow more rapid 
consumption with one or two years seems unacceptable.
On the issue of vehicles in Indigenous community governance, I could also tell the story of an Indigenous 
community government CEO who went to his council seeking clarifi cation and prioritisation of the use 
of council vehicles. Being open to the need to support activities in the community beyond those directly 
involved in council employment, he suggested that attending funerals and sports carnivals was a permissible 
use, but that council policy should be that it is a lower priority than the business of council employees and of 
employment matters in the community more generally. The council however, disagreed, installing funerals as 
the highest priority and leaving the CEO with a policy which would, no doubt, be questioned by the various 
funders of council vehicles. This CEO’s task of strategically balancing different accountabilities was clearly 
not going to be easy.
Stories about demands on vehicles abound in Indigenous community governance, as access to transport is 
clearly both a highly valued and a very scarce resource, particularly in remote Indigenous communities. One 
insightful line of commentary and questioning, which emerged when I fi rst gave this paper as a seminar in 
Darwin, was whether there would be anything like the same level of demand and potential for disputation 
if the resources being offered by a social-justice-inspired state program were jobs or buildings. Another line 
of commentary was that only a Commonwealth department which had had little historical involvement in 
CENTRE FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
DISCUSSION PAPER N0. 280 9
this area would offer vehicles in such a naïve and potentially fraught way as the women’s truck story implies. 
The Northern Territory Government, it was suggested, had learnt from greater exposure and past experience 
not to offer vehicles in such a manner. While these are both useful lines of commentary, it does seem to me 
that there is still a general problem here which cannot be avoided. 
The problem is that when the state devises programs and commits resources aimed at public purposes and 
involves Indigenous community organisations in the pursuit of those purposes, people working in these 
Indigenous community organisations cannot usually avoid also allocating private benefi ts while pursuing 
these public purposes. True there are public goods like roads, parks, rubbish runs and electricity and water 
supply systems which Indigenous community councils can provide without getting too intimately involved 
in processes of distributing resources to individuals. However, if this was all that Indigenous community 
councils did, they would probably not be seen as doing enough for their constituents. Further, even were 
councils to restrict themselves to the provision of these more public goods, there would still be the issue of 
who gets the job grading the road, or on the garbage run, or attending to the electricity and water supply 
infrastructure, and to what extent having these jobs also means better access to vehicles and houses in 
comparison to other community members. Access to jobs, vehicles and houses are all private benefi ts derived 
in the course of the state pursuing public purposes in conjunction with Indigenous community councils and 
there is, quite simply, no other way in which the state, and the community councils, can act. 
Hence public purposes and private benefi ts are not different ways in which the state can commit resources, 
but rather different perspectives on the same state action: the allocation of public resources. A job given to 
person x can be defended as an appropriate pursuit of public purpose y, on the grounds of merit, technical 
competence, requisite local knowledge, or some other pre-specifi ed criteria. A house allocated to person or 
family z can be defended as an appropriate way of addressing outstanding housing need in the community. 
But these very same actions can also be seen as favouritism towards that person in comparison to other 
persons who also have claims to either that competence or need. And the senior managers who are seen 
as having ultimate responsibility for these allocative decisions will, no doubt, be accused of favouritism, 
nepotism, incompetence and even corruption. They can, of course, anticipate and attempt to lessen such 
accusations by laying down decision criteria beforehand and putting decision processes out in public. But 
this will still not stop some people from adopting a private benefi ts perspective on those decisions, rather 
than a public purposes one.
Barry Hindess makes a closely related point in his recent review of corruption and Australian public life more 
generally. He argues that disagreements about corruption refl ect ‘competing understandings of the public 
interest and the proper purpose of government’ and are part of ‘the normal condition of politics’ (Hindess 
2004: vii–viii). Those close to decision-making processes in any area of public life may take a somewhat 
more ‘relaxed view of what is acceptable’ than those who are more distant, suggesting that their mode of 
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operation is simply what it takes to get things done in this area (Hindess 2004: viii). However, those more 
distant from the circumstances and events of particular decision contexts will want to push for the relevance 
and upholding of more general decision-making principles and may accuse those close to the processes of 
going too far in their ‘whatever it takes’ attitudes.1 Hence, like all people who become involved in public 
life and public decision-making processes, senior managers in Indigenous communities should expect 
accusations of maladministration and incompetence, or even corruption, and should be prepared to weather 
and to manage such accusations. 
Senior managers involved in Indigenous community governance are not, in that sense, the exceptions 
of Australian public life, but rather part of its rule. Nor, for that matter, are the two Northern Territory 
Government ministers with whose words we began exceptional, as they accused others in somewhat 
different positions in public life to themselves of incompetence or corruption. Things always look different 
from different positions within the structures of public life, as people debate and pursue public purposes and 
the public interest while at the same time deriving private benefi ts.
Perhaps another way to make this point about public purposes and private benefi ts is to argue that Folds’ 
analysis relies on an image of the state that is too idealist and one-dimensional, while his analysis of Pintupi 
settlements is much more realist, contextual and concerned with material resources. While the state does, as 
Folds contends, articulate the ideal of achieving material equality between different common-interest groups 
in the name of social justice, it also articulates many other competing ideals, such as encouraging economic 
development, rewarding individual and corporate initiative, providing scope for choice and supporting 
families. So how does the social justice and material equality ideal relate to these other ideals, which may at 
times seem to push in other directions? Beyond these competing ideals there is also the question of what the 
state does, more materially, and how this is understood by the citizenry. One of the earliest and most quoted 
realist characterisations of the Australian state was Hancock’s idea, dating from 1930, that:
Australian democracy has come to look upon the State as a vast public utility, whose duty is to provide 
the greatest happiness to the greatest number … collective power at the service of individualistic ‘rights’ 
(Hancock 1961: 55).
In reminding us of this characterisation over fi fty years later, Galligan argued that it was somewhat 
‘exaggerated’ and incomplete, but not that it was wrong. Indeed he wanted to build on Hancock’s analysis 
in encouraging Australian political science away from a narrow focus on political institutions and processes 
towards more political economy, with a focus on both the corporate and the individual private benefi ts 
emerging from political processes (Galligan 1984). This more realist image of the Australian state resonates 
with Folds’ portrayal of Pintupi understandings of governments which, like seniors in Pintupi society, build 
their moral authority through materially looking after people. So perhaps Pintupi and other Australians 
1. The ‘whatever it takes’ phrase was, of course, made famous in Australian politics in the late 1990s as the title of 
the autobiography of former Labor power broker and minister, Graham Richardson.
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view government, or the state, quite similarly if we focus in both instances on realist or materialist views of 
political processes rather than in one instance on realist views and in the other on more idealist views.
This mixing of idealist and realist views may also be true in relation to Folds’ economic analysis. Recall that 
Folds’ saw the Pintupi emphasis on current resource use as ‘antithetical’ to a ‘sacred’ western emphasis on 
resource hoarding and accumulation. While it seems to me that western economic ideals do emphasise 
hoarding rather than heavy current use of resources, economic value does ultimately inhere in use and 
so western economic practice involves much more balancing of current use and hoarding than the ideal 
suggests. Also it is not clear to me that western ideals for state economic practices are quite the same as for 
private economic practice. Do good state managers hoard resources, or do they spend their budgets fully, 
or perhaps even overspend them a little, in order to demonstrate that they are pursuing public purposes for 
which there is considerable demand or need, while also being reasonably fi scally responsible? I suspect they 
do more of the latter than the former.
Hence if we adopt a more realist image of both the Australian state and of western economic practice, as 
well as of Pintupi lifeways and worldviews, we can argue that Folds has somewhat overdrawn the differences 
across the settlement interface. My point here is not to argue that there are not real and substantial 
differences of lifeways and worldviews across the Indigenous settlement interface. Like Folds, I believe 
there are. I also believe that Folds analysis is insightful not only in relation to Pintupi but also in relation to 
other Indigenous people, at least in remote areas. David Martin’s work on Indigenous culture and economy 
in Cape York makes similar points about the intensive use, rather than hoarding, of resources and it also 
draws on a more general literature on ‘demand sharing’ in Australian Indigenous societies (Martin 1995). My 
point is simply to argue that Folds has somewhat overdrawn the idea of difference in worldviews across the 
settlement interface and that we can understand many of the phenomena that he observes at that interface 
without having to resort to an explanation based so heavily on different worldviews. 
My more minimalist explanation would argue that there are always tensions and accusations of incompetence 
and corruption in public life as public purposes are pursued and as the resources devoted to those purposes 
inevitably become used in ways which also bring private benefi ts to particular individuals, families and 
corporations. What we observe at the remote settlement interface in Indigenous community governance is 
not totally different from what we might observe in other, more mainstream local government, or in public 
life more generally, as the pursuit of public purposes also produces a fl ow of private benefi ts.
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A REALIST VIEW OF BEING A GOOD SENIOR MANAGER 
So where does this more thoroughly realist analysis take us in relation to being a good senior manager 
in Indigenous community governance? First and foremost, it tells us that the job of senior managers in 
Indigenous community governance is about getting resources out to Indigenous people. This material reality 
should be acknowledged and embraced, rather than denied or embarrassingly conceded in deference to 
some more idealist view of the Australian state or Indigenous community processes. Behind every idealist 
image of the Australian state or Indigenous community processes there is still a material reality of the 
allocation of public resources.
Second, we should acknowledge that allocated public resources will probably be quite heavily used and 
therefore also, in many instances, quite quickly consumed. Senior managers should not expect great support 
among Indigenous representatives or constituents for rules and practices which hoard resources on the 
basis of narrow defi nitions of public purpose or in anticipation of some leaner public policy future. The 
predominant pressure and political dynamic will be to use available resources quite quickly to meet pressing 
needs in Indigenous communities. Indeed while being fi scally responsible within existing budgets, senior 
managers in Indigenous communities should not become too greatly concerned with hoarding resources. 
This is more a private, western economic ideal than a public economic practice, where full spending of 
budgets is the norm and a part of ongoing budgetary claim-making. Senior managers will probably be more 
greatly appreciated and rewarded, both by government funders and by Indigenous constituents, if they keep 
resources fl owing to community members and also seek out ways of sustainably expanding total resource 
fl ows.
Third, within whatever level of resource fl ows they have, senior managers in Indigenous community 
governance should expect pressures for concentration and unevenness in the distribution of these resources, 
as much as for widespread, even distribution. Some degree of unevenness in the distribution of resources 
is perhaps inevitable, particularly with large, less-easily-divisible resources like jobs, houses and pieces of 
physical infrastructure. Also uneven distribution of resources to particular places, families and individuals is 
not in itself necessarily a bad thing, but it will need to be defended in terms of the public purposes it serves. 
Indeed any distribution of resources—however even or uneven—between Indigenous places, families and 
individuals will need to be defended in terms of the public purposes it serves, both to the community being 
served and to the funders of various programs. 
Hence a fourth fi nding of the analysis is that the defence of resource distributions in the language of public 
purposes is a major part of the senior manager’s job. To treat such defence as somehow secondary to, or less 
important than the actual distribution of resources would be a major mistake. Defending actual material 
distributions in the language of public purposes is what strategically balancing different accountabilities 
and perceptions is largely about.
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The converse of this fourth point is that any material distribution of resources can also be interpreted as 
unfair or inappropriate and as not fulfi lling public purposes. So a fi fth fi nding is that senior managers should 
expect to be accused of unfairness, incompetence and even corruption quite frequently in the course of 
their jobs, both by Indigenous constituents and by funding bodies. Accusations may be somewhat fewer if 
senior managers have paid attention to and actively managed perceptions of resource distributions, but they 
will never go away entirely. The best defence against such accusations is conventional good governance:
being open and transparent about council and senior managerial decision making, and putting out to the
public realm as much as possible of the processes and thinking that goes into making decisions. This will 
make allegations of incompetence and corruption harder to sustain in the light of public evidence, but it 
will not make them go away.
A sixth fi nding, arising from the above, is that the skills of being a good senior manager in Indigenous 
community governance are as much political and strategic as they are technical, fi nancial or administrative. 
Good senior managers need a clear strategic understanding of the circumstances and interests pushing in on 
them, and a sense of how to balance and accommodate their differing requirements and demands while still 
keeping the resources fl owing out to Indigenous people. Good technical, fi nancial or administrative skills are 
clearly a bonus, but they won’t be enough without some broader, quite political, strategic understandings 
and abilities. Indeed, technical skills, such as in fi nances, can conceivably be ‘bought in’ by senior managers 
in Indigenous community governance from other organisations like accounting fi rms, but a strategic sense 
of the circumstances in which they operate would seem almost impossible to outsource.
Seventh, I want to return to one of Folds’ points which, like his difference of worldviews across the settlement 
interface, is perhaps a little overstated, but still has some cogency and merit. This is the point that we should 
not necessarily expect local Indigenous people always to be keen to take on these senior managerial roles 
in Indigenous community governance, even when they have the necessary technical skills, such as literacy 
and numeracy, and have shown leadership tendencies among their social peers. These jobs are very tough 
assignments, both strategically (in terms of the balancing of diverse interests and accountabilities) and 
personally (in terms weathering the inevitable accusations of misconduct and corruption). Many local 
Indigenous people, like many non-Indigenous people, simply will not wish to take them on. And even those 
who do may look to people from outside their local family networks to take ultimate responsibility for any 
particularly ‘hard’ decisions which restrict people’s access to resources or which strongly direct other people’s 
behaviour. 
I note, in relation to these last two points, that John Ah Kit, the Indigenous, Northern Territory, Labor Party 
Minister with whose words I began, had a successful career as a senior manager in a number of Indigenous 
community organisations before entering the Legislative Assembly in 1995. Also, one of Labor’s 2005 
additions to its Northern Territory Legislative Assembly team, Alison Anderson, is another example of an 
Indigenous person with a successful managerial career in Indigenous community governance organisations. 
She was the CEO of Papunya Aboriginal Community Council for a decade and a half before becoming a 
Commissioner of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission in early 2000. Hence, somewhat 
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qualifying Folds’ analysis on this point, there are Indigenous people who are willing to take on these senior 
managerial roles in Indigenous community governance, and who can use them to launch larger-scale 
political careers. But both Anderson and Ah Kit, it seems to me, illustrate the importance and primacy of 
having strategic political skills to survive and fl ourish in these roles. From observation of their careers, I 
would argue that both have these strategic political skills in abundance and have relied on others around 
them for technical, administrative or fi nancial expertise.
In summary, I want to argue just two things in relation to the practical realities of being a senior manager 
in Indigenous community governance. The fi rst is that this is a very tough job, with different expectations, 
perceptions and accountabilities pushing in on it from different sides. In this environment, just surviving in 
the job for a few years and leaving in an orderly fashion can be quite an achievement in itself. The second 
is that if, in our analysis of how and why things go wrong in Indigenous community governance, we focus 
on the competence and ethical qualities of particular individuals who at various times occupy these key 
managerial roles, then we will miss the opportunity to see that it is the isolation of these managerial roles 
which is the more pressing and fundamental problem. I want to conclude therefore, by returning to the idea 
of isolated managerialism and how to overcome it.
OVERCOMING ISOLATED MANAGERIALISM
I will begin this fi nal section with another story about being a senior manager in Indigenous community 
governance which, to my mind, illustrates both the diffi culty of the job and also of making judgments about 
the goodness of senior managers, whether in terms of competence or ethical standards. I want to argue 
that, rather than being focused on these issues, analysts and would-be-reformers of Indigenous community 
governance should be focused more on overcoming isolated managerialism. The story also, incidentally, 
illustrates once again some of the potential pitfalls of greater regionalism in Indigenous community 
governance.
My story dates from a decade ago, and relates to one of the earliest instances of adopting a regional 
approach to Indigenous community governance in the Northern Territory. Ten small localities were 
encouraged to come together as a single council, with each locality having two council members. Soon after 
the council’s formation the issue arose of how councillors were to get to the monthly meeting, as some of 
them had almost 200 kilometres to travel. The CEO of the time worked out that the council could lease a 
vehicle for each of the outlying council wards, which the councillors could use both to get to meetings and 
to attend to constituency matters in between times. All went well, until it became evident that the vehicles 
were doing far more kilometres than was allowed for under the terms of the leases and that, because of 
this, not only were there additional running costs but also some lease penalty clauses kicked in. After three 
years, as the leases were coming to an end, there was also the issue of whether the condition of the vehicles 
met the terms of the leases, and if not what penalties might again apply. The council was, at the end of 
the three-year leasing period, facing a fi nancial overrun relating to the vehicles of the order of a couple of 
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hundred thousand dollars. The CEO chose at this time to terminate his employment with the council, leaving 
his deputy to bring in the leased vehicles from the councillors, deal with the fi nancial overrun and inform 
the councillors that in the future they would not be able to have vehicles on the same basis as they had in 
the past. This was not an easy process and, within a year, the deputy had also terminated his employment 
with the council.
A decade later, I can report that this CEO is still remembered among councillors as someone who was ‘good’ 
and could deliver resources. Others with a more fi nancially-informed, external perspective, including myself, 
might judge him somewhat differently. But it is not clear to me that he can be simply judged as ‘bad’, or 
incompetent or corrupt. Positively, he was innovative and entrepreneurial in his use of vehicle leasing as a 
way of responding to the legitimate concerns of councillors. Perhaps he was somewhat naïve about the level 
of vehicle use that would ensue. Or perhaps, if he was more knowing, then he was somewhat unstrategic if 
he saw his future with the council lasting any longer than the terms of the vehicle leases. 
All these judgments about this person’s competence and ethical standing could be thrown around and 
debated. But the one thing that seems to me very clear is that this senior manager was, systemically, 
very isolated. Where was the learning from the past about the pitfalls of leasing vehicles under standard 
government arrangements for use in Indigenous community governance? Where were the system supports 
and supervisory structures which could or should have brought these pitfalls to this CEO’s attention? Where 
was the career structure with horizons beyond the life of these leases which might have made this CEO think 
twice about the reasonably anticipatable consequences of the decision to lease these vehicles? None of these 
structures and processes seemed to be in place. This CEO, in a new, larger, regional community government 
in the Northern Territory was as much on his own, unguided and unsupervised, as his counterpart in a 
smaller more localised community government. Indeed regionalism was, ironically, part of the source of his 
problems, as it gave legitimacy to the demands of councillors for vehicles, in that they needed to attend 
monthly meetings away from their home communities.
I do not wish, here, to be overly critical of the push towards regionalism in Indigenous community governance 
in the Northern Territory. As suggested in my earlier paper (Sanders 2004), my aim, if this is possible, is to 
be both critical and supportive of this regionalism push. But greater regionalism alone will only marginally 
reduce the organisational and career isolation of senior managers in Indigenous community governance 
organisations. These will still be small organisations with only a few managerial staff. So it is links beyond 
the individual Indigenous community governance organisation which must be developed and come into play 
if isolated managerialism is to be more fully overcome. 
The most obvious external people to be supporting, and in the process also mutually checking, these 
isolated managers in Indigenous community governance are the managers of funding programs in higher-
level government agencies. These program managers in higher-level government organisations need, 
in the fi rst instance at least, to see their job as supporting and assisting senior managers in Indigenous 
community governance, rather than standing distant from them or assuming, at the outset, that they will be 
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incompetent or corrupt. They need to show empathy and understanding for the diffi cult strategic balancing 
of accountabilities in which senior managers in Indigenous community governance are involved and to 
work with them in achieving an acceptable balance. This supportive primary relationship should achieve a 
lot more than an inspectorial mindset, which does not recognise the complex governance environment in 
which Indigenous community managers operate and which starts from a position of distrust and suspicion. 
This does not mean, of course, that instances of incompetence, and even corruption, among senior managers 
in Indigenous community governance will not be found. They will. But they will be understood against a 
background of the diffi culty of the job and in the context of a primary relationship which asks ‘what can be 
done to support these managers?’
In this regard I note that the Northern Territory Department of Local Government, Housing and Sport has 
in the last couple of years begun appointing Community Development Offi cers to work with Indigenous 
community organisations in a more supportive role. Such offi cers often now attend Council meetings and 
act as an external resource person for senior managers in Indigenous community governance as they attempt 
to progress issues between Council meetings. In many ways I think this is a more important development 
for Indigenous community governance in the Northern Territory than the push towards larger regional local 
governments. This more supportive and understanding relationship between the offi cers of the Northern 
Territory Local Government Department and the Indigenous community governments which it funds and 
regulates is a major step towards overcoming isolated managerialism, which other government agencies at 
the Commonwealth and State/Territory level of Australian government could well add to and emulate.
One other way to overcome isolated managerialism would be to develop more lateral relations between small 
Indigenous community governments and local governments elsewhere in Australia. These arrangements 
could offer things as simple as staff cover during leave, or managerial and professional development through 
short-term placements in one organisation from the other. They could also offer things such as fi nancial 
and administrative system support and a general sense of perspective that while every local government is 
unique, there is also a great similarity in what these organisations do and contend with.
Conceptually, overcoming isolated managerialism could be related to what one recent contribution to 
the Australian Journal of Public Administration saw as developing a ‘theory of coherence and mutual 
accountability’ in the ‘integrity systems’ of public decision making (Sampford, Smith and Brown 2005). These 
authors want to replace the ‘Greek temple’ metaphor of integrity systems, involving an image of several 
different pillars holding up a roof, with a ‘bird’s nest’ image, involving far larger numbers of links or twigs 
of mutual accountability and support. Following Mulgan, they want to envisage multiple relationships of 
mutual accountability between guardians of the public interest in interlinked networks (Mulgan 2003). Each 
mutual accountability link, or twig in the bird’s nest, is on its own fragile and insuffi cient, but together with 
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the large number of other such links or twigs, it develops a structure of surprising strength and support for 
the individual decision maker who sits within it. This is what is required to overcome isolated managerialism 
in Indigenous community governance and to ensure that senior managers in this diffi cult governance 
environment are supported to be good, rather than left alone to discover the pitfalls of their position, then 
belatedly condemned for being bad.
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